The late 1930s saw a heavy cloud hang over Britain as Germany made its intentions ever clearer, and those intentions were very likely to culminate in war between the two countries.
It was obvious that Britain would need to do something, but quite what that something was, remained unclear, until 1939, when war became to be seen as unavoidable and measures had to be taken to prepare the country for conflict.
It was in May of that year that the government introduced a £2 subsidy for every acre of old pasture that was ploughed over for the planting of tillage crops, firing the starting pistol for the home battle of farm production.
In announcing the subsidy the then Minister of Agriculture, Reginald Dorman Smith, who had previously been president of the National Farmers’ Union (NFU) noted that:
“The government consider that the best preparation for an emergency is to bring the land into a state of greater fertility.”
Farming gains recognition
He also made a point of indicating that farms and farmland were to be considered national assets, a view that hitherto had been absent from politics and government thinking.
However, farmers were now to be appreciated as it was obvious that food production needed to be ramped up considerably, yet they were also warned that they must plough with the ultimate view of fertility should they “desire to keep on good terms with the government”.
This new enthusiasm for the land was roundly applauded by the likes of George Stapledon, who’s name is celebrated in the ‘S’ prefix of Aberystwyth-bred grass and clover varieties.
He declared it a turning point in the affairs and prosperity of agriculture and rural Britain, and immediately rushed to print a booklet advising farmers on how best to re-establish stale old grassland with fresh young leys.
Unfortunately for his optimism, the government had other ideas about land use and set a course towards increasing production of potatoes and wheat – two tillage crops that would displace livestock which, at the time, relied heavily on imported feedstuffs.
It was argued that 7t of imported feedstuffs for animals equated to 1t of wheat if fed directly to humans as bread.
It therefore made a great deal more sense to fill precious shipping capacity with cereals, rather than oil cake for cattle, and devote British farmland to cereal production, rather than grass.
Tractors – the vital element
This then was the overall plan of the government, but to plough all the land, it needed tractors and these were not as yet particularly common on farms, the horse was still, by far, the most dominant power source in the field.
One manufacturer who was in a position to help alleviate the situation, was Ford, which had built a factory at Dagenham to produce the Fordson N.
However, due to the recession of 19371938, it was now producing only 55 tractors a day, which is well below capacity, yet even so, a stock of tractors had still built up at the factory and in dealers yards.
With the storm of war on the horizon, Ford approached the Ministry in 1938 to suggest that it should purchase a fleet of tractors, ready for when it arrived.
This initial approach was unsuccessful, but the following year when the thunder of battle was coming dangerously close, the Ministry called Ford and struck a deal in June 1939 which seemed to weigh remarkably in favour of the government.
Government gains with Fordson deal
It was agreed that Ford would produce, at its own expense, 3000 tractors over the next six months to be stored and maintained by Ford dealers.
If war did eventually break out, the government would purchase the tractors at a 27.5% discount. But if peace ensured instead, then the government would be under no obligation to Ford.
On the face of it, this would appear to be a huge risk and a most un-business-like agreement for a company to enter into, yet it was signed after the £2 subsidy had been announced with the target of ploughing 1.7 million acres in all – a total spend of 3.4 million on farming.
Secondly, it was by then, obvious that war was certain to occur and Germany had a fleet of U Boats ready to cut off Britain’s supplies from oversees – home grown food was going to become critical in feeding the population.
Competing with the Fordson
A third point which doesn’t appear to have been discussed to any great extent, is that Ford would have been well aware that it faced little competition from other manufacturers, and even if it did, then this swamping of the market would have kept them at bay.
As it turned out to be the case, Britain found itself at war with Germany in September of 1939, the government bought the tractors and the competition had no chance to prosper.
There three potential alternatives to the Fordson tractor at the time, David Brown, Marshall and the Ferguson-Ford 9N, but all three were up against one overriding feature of the Fordson, and that was its price.
The machine was outdated, had an inefficient transmission, could be difficult to start and was way behind technology-wise in comparison to two of its rivals, but it was a known-quantity and it was cheap.
Not only was the Fordson cheap, but the deal gave the government access to a fleet of new tractors with full dealer support across the country, ready to swing into action at any given moment.
David Brown comes second
Just prior to the war, David Brown had fallen out with Harry Ferguson, insisting that a bigger tractor was required.
Ferguson then crossed the Atlantic to talk to Henry Ford about production of his smaller tractor, they shook hands on a deal and the rest of that story has now become history.
David Brown had made around 1,100 Ferguson Browns before the split and its subsequent production of its own 35hp VAK1. This new tractor was recognised by the ministry as being superior to the Fordson, but it was a good deal more expensive.
The DB company was primarily a gear manufacturer and was told that it would not be allocated materials for building tractors until it could fulfil all its orders for tank gearboxes.
However, it did produce 5,350 VAK1s during the war most of which entered service as airfield tractors.
Out of the running
Marshall was another contender, but its models were considered too unwieldy despite possessing the great virtue of being able to run on pretty much anything that wouldn’t work elsewhere. The company was also busy with naval work.
This left the Ferguson Ford handshake tractor which was seriously considered by the ministry for production.
Unfortunately, it would have required the expense and effort of tooling up and the construction of a new factory, absorbing resources that could be used elsewhere in the war effort, so it too was dropped.
In resisting the demands of the other manufacturers that they too should have a slice of the cake the government, in the form of Donald Ferguson (no relation), noted that:
“It is clearly in the national interest that we should take a firm stand against this agitation, and I think that by doing so now we shall save worse trouble later on”.
And so it was that the UK agricultural war effort was built around a machine dating from the very early days of the tractor, despite the great advances that had been made since.
It was much like the RAF depending on the Sopwith Camel for the duration of the war, a situation which would never have been tolerated.
Around 138,000 Fordsons were built during the war, the vast majority of which stayed in Britain. As old hat as they were, they still made a vital contribution to the feeding the country during those dark years and that legacy should not be forgotten.
